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ORDERS 1AA-06-20210326

Following decades of civil war, and superpower interference, Takistan is finally on the cusp of a negotiated settlement between the major factions. However, a Takistani warlord, by the name of Hormuz at-Baaz has launched a major power play by mobilising an armoured brigade and is currently sweeping across the Western side of the country. He is expected to hit the Kujari region in 24 hours, and the capital in 36 hours. Intelligence suggests that at-Baaz is seeking to occupy the capital and hijack the peace talks or enforce his agenda onto the associated powers. HUMINT reporting suggests that Baaz is relying on Western antipathy in the face of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic – and he is not far off – NATO forces have mobilised 1AA assets to delay Baaz’s forces while member states negotiate the deployment of additional military assets to the region. As it stands, the only additional support elements available in theatre is a small JSOC team who care currently training host nation forces. Previous intelligence indicates that Baaz is a mid-ranking warlord at best, without access to heavy equipment, armour, or aviation assets, and there are significant concerns around who is equipping him and his followers. Additionally, the Al-Qaeda franchise, Al-Qaeda in Takistan (AQIT (Ay-Kit), been seen collaborating with Takistani Taliban (TakTal) – very much their traditional enemies - but upper echelons within AQIT have been seen interacting with Hormuz Baaz and his top military advisors. These factors suggest that AQIT are central to the recent developments within Takistan as a whole, and Hormuz Baaz’s rapid increase in military capability.

(1)  Terrain

Unlike the southern and eastern side of Takistan, the Kujari region is relatively flat with little undulation. The ground is bisected by a large “Green Zone” around the primary water features of the River PESO, running east-west, as well as Lake KWAZI. The majority of the settlements in the region lie abandoned as the local population were displaced by AQIT, and before them, TakTal. Those civilians that remain, do so out of loyalty to the local militias, and while they are not actively hostile, they should always be considered a security risk. With that in mind, built up areas are to be avoided by at least 2km by aviation assets, and 1km by ground force elements.
Finally, there are no functioning medical facilities in the region, therefore, T2 and T3 casualties are to be evacuated via air at the earliest opportunity.

(2)  Friendly Forces


There are two, 12-man JSOC teams in theatre training Takistani National Army (TNA) special forces. One of these teams has been diverted to the Kujari region to secure an airstrip and establish supply cache’s for 1AA’s use on insertion.


Given the remoteness of the Kujari region, 1AA will initially insert with limited aviation assets. USAF C130s will be used to insert personnel and equipment into the region, but commanders can initially expect access to OWL and BUZZARD for the initial stages of the campaign.

(3)  Enemy Forces

at-Baaz – Armoured Infantry Brigade

Hormuz at-Baaz Armoured Infantry Brigade is something on an enigma within Takistan and, given that at-Baaz and his militia are unlikely to have had access to the kit and equipment themselves, the nature, training and quality of the fighting personnel is an unknown. What is known is that he has access to a small fleet of helicopters (Mi-8 and Hueys), somewhere in the region of 24 heavy armour (T-72), and likely double that number of armoured personnel carriers (BRDM, BMP-1/DMP-2). The likelihood is that he has been supplied and trained by one of the neighbouring, former Soviet states, which means that the tactics and doctrine employed are likely to be along the lines of GENFORCE doctrine we have seen employed by such forces in the past. Therefore, you can expect some kind on airborne assault to be rapidly followed up by land based heavy armour.

AQIT (Ay-kit)

AQIT forces in the region are likely to be few and far between and will only stand out if their specialist skills are employed. The teams in Takistan are highly proficient in the employment of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), including vehicle-born, victim operated, and suicide bombers. AQIT also specialise in hostage taking and single round, small arms fire (SRSAF) attacks. They are generally equipped with soviet era long-barrelled weapons and munitions, as well as access to a wide variety of regular and irregular munitions from which they construct their IEDs. However, they lack access to heavy weaponry and have limited mobility.

Takistani Taliban (TakTal)
The TakTal forces within the Kujari region are made up of a disparate, loosely unified militia – the most organised, and best equipped of which, have seized the former British Forward Operating Base (FOB) FOB Axios. They have access to a number of soviet-era, vehicle mounted weapons, as well as artillery and mortars. TakTal personnel are proficient in the use of their weapon systems, but have little or no second-line support. Therefore, eradication of any capability currently in theatre, is likely to remove it from the playing field for the duration of the deployment.


a. INFILTRATE into the Kujari region and SEIZE FOB Axios.
b. DELAY Baaz Armoured infantry brigade and deny freedom of movement within the region.
c. DESTROY AQIT capability within Kujari region.

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